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Introduction 
 People often experience pride in their moral accomplishments (Etxebarria, 
Ortiz, Apodaca, Pascual, & Conejero, 2015), and pride derived from such activities 
may encourage further cooperative and prosocial conduct (Dorfman, Eyal, & Bereby-
Meyer, 2014; Hart & Matsuba, 2007; Sanders, Wisse, Van Yperen, & Rus, 2016). At 
the same time, pride may have a dark side, as the experience of pride has been linked 
to competitiveness, status striving, arrogance, narcissism, and overconfidence (Cheng, 
Tracy, & Henrich, 2010; Holbrook, Piazza, & Fessler, 2014a; Tracy, Cheng, Robins, 
& Trzesniewski, 2009; Tracy & Robins, 2007a). Research on moral licensing, 
although yet to be directly linked to pride, also suggests that feeling proud of one’s 
moral activities may under certain circumstances lead to temporary disengagement 
from moral activities (Effron & Conway, 2015; Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010; 
Mullen & Monin, 2016). That is, reflecting on a moral accomplishment, as one is 
prone to do during experiences of pride, may at times decrease the likelihood of 
repeating the behavior in the immediate future. 
 In this chapter, we begin by reviewing the literature on pride outside of the 
domain of morality, in the domain of expertise and competence, which some would 
argue is pride’s proper domain. Indeed, the majority of the psychological literature on 
pride has focused not on pride elicited by moral or prosocial action, but pride elicited 
by demonstrations of competence or skill, such as winning a gold medal in a sports 
competition or an award for academic excellence (e.g., see Cheng et al., 2010; Tracy 
& Matsumoto, 2008; Tracy, Shariff, & Cheng, 2010; Williams & DeSteno, 2008, 
2009). Consistent with Williams and DeSteno (2008), we argue that pride is a highly 
“social” emotion, insofar as the experience of pride is greatly amplified when the 
agent perceives there to be a public recognition of their accomplishments or the 
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product of one’s efforts is thought to have societal value. Secondly, we argue that it is 
the presence of a beneficiary that principally distinguishes moral pride from 
competence pride. This “other-focused” aspect of moral pride, we contend, creates 
unique challenges in the communication of this pride to others.  
 It has been argued that pride’s motivational role is to promote continued effort 
toward future achievement and status striving (Williams & DeSteno, 2008, 2009). 
Yet, at the same time, recent work on moral licensing suggests that reflecting on one’s 
moral achievements may not always foster renewed effort toward one’s moral goals, 
as performing a moral deed can sometimes serve to justify (or “license”) inaction or 
even misconduct.  In this chapter, we offer a model for discriminating when feelings 
of pride are likely to promote persistent effort, rather than licensing effects. We build 
on the work of Effron and Conway (2015), Fishbach and Woolley (2015), and Mullen 
and Monin (2016), who argue that consistency effects (i.e., when reflecting on one’s 
past accomplishments motivates similar goals and behaviors) are more likely when 
the agent has a stake in the activity, such that an important aspect of a person’s 
identity would be compromised by disengaging from the activity.  
 We close the chapter by reviewing the unique challenges posed by the 
experience of moral pride. We argue that the expression of pride is largely perceived 
by others as communicating a competitive, status-striving orientation (e.g., Shariff & 
Tracy, 2009), while moral evaluations depend on the perception of genuine altruistic 
motives (Chee & Murachver, 2012; Critcher & Dunning, 2011; Newman & Cain, 
2014). Therefore, expressing pride in one’s moral achievements may serve to overturn 
the perceived altruistic motive guiding the act and therefore undermine the 
fundamental social benefit of engaging in moral acts, namely, that others perceive one 
as a truly moral person worth interacting with. By contrast, people who display pride 
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in achievements in competitive arenas, based on difficult-to-acquire skills, may be 
given a social “pass” in a manner different from expressions of moral pride, since 
their motives for achieving are aligned with the self-interested transmission of such 
achievements.    
Pride as a Highly Social Emotion 
Pride has been defined as a “self-conscious” emotion insofar as its experience 
requires a self-evaluation, which may not be true of all emotions (Lewis, Sullivan, 
Stanger, & Weiss, 1989; Tangney, 1990; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007; Tracy 
& Robins, 2007b; Tracy & Robins, 2004). We would agree that pride is a self-
conscious emotion in that one of its psychological antecedents is the recognition of a 
goal attained via a person’s efforts, or, in the case of “vicarious” pride, a goal attained 
by someone with whom one strongly identifies (in this manner, the person’s 
accomplishments are an extension of the self – see Figure 1). However, our model 
places equal emphasis on the personal and social dimensions of pride. On our view, it 
is not enough to achieve a goal—the goal should be one that the agent believes will be 
valued by others. We do not expect an individual to experience pride when the 
activity of their agency fails to produce a socially merited outcome. Indeed, consistent 
with this assertion, a recent study by Etxebarria, Ortiz, Apodaca, Pascual, and 
Conejero (2014) had Spanish teenagers, ages 14-16 years, consider hypothetical 
scenarios where they might help someone that fellow group members either liked or 
did not like. Contrary to what might be expected based on the difficulty of the act, the 
teenagers in their study reported that they would experience less pride when helping 
someone disliked by the group than when helping someone liked by the group. This 
was true independent of the perceived cost of helping the individual. Thus, even 
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effortful behaviors may fail to produce much pride if the agent appraises their actions 
as disjunctive with relevant social norms shared by valued others.
1
  
There have been a number of attempts to model the cognitive antecedents of 
pride (Decrop & Derbaix, 2010; Lewis, Alessandri, & Sullivan, 1992; Tracy & 
Robins, 2007b; Weiner, 1985). At their core, what these perspectives appear to agree 
on is that pride is an emotional reaction to the awareness of agency, i.e., the goal-
directed activity of an agent. In attributionist terms this involves an internal 
attribution, i.e., locating the cause of the activity inside the agent rather than 
attributing the cause of the success to external forces or luck (Weiner, 1985). Tracy 
and Robins (2007a, b) have gone further and articulated two variants of pride, 
“authentic” and “hubristic” pride, that divide along additional appraisal dimensions of 
temporal stability and controllability. In this formulation, both authentic and hubristic 
pride are elicited following an internal attribution, yet authentic pride involves 
appraisals of unstable and controllable causes (e.g., temporary effort), while hubristic 
pride involves appraisals of stable and uncontrollable causes (e.g., enduring skill).  
There is mixed evidence for this “two-facet” model of pride. Holbrook et al. (2014a) 
and Holbrook, Piazza, and Fessler (2014b) have argued that hubristic pride, as it has 
been measured by Tracy and Robins (2007a) with words such as “conceited,” “stuck 
up,” and “arrogant,” is simply a critical appraisal of someone expressing pride, and 
not a second “facet” of pride emotion (cf. Tracy & Robins, 2014). Nonetheless, what 
seems to be uncontroversial is that perceptions of agency, or goal attainment, are 
essential for experiencing pride.   
                                                        
1
 Of course, people may experience pride in counter-normative actions insofar as their 
achievements represent actions that violate the prevailing views of a majority group, 
while at the same time being fully consistent with a minority opinion, e.g., an animal 
advocate experiencing pride in opposing the widespread consumer purchasing of 
animal products.     
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We have used the term “agency”—rather than internal attribution or self-
efficacy—in our model to highlight that pride requires appraisals of goal-directed 
activity generated by an agent. We prefer the term agency on account of research on 
group-based and vicarious pride (e.g., van Leeuwen, van Dijk, & Kaynak, 2013), 
which highlights that the experience of pride is not limited to evaluations of one’s 
own agency or competence. One may experience pride when reflecting on the 
achievements of one’s own group or a close other, and the magnitude of this vicarious 
pride, like all vicarious emotions, depends on how strongly one identifies with the 
group/other (see Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998; Mashuri & 
Zaduqisti, 2014). 
While perceived agency may be necessary for pride, not just any agency will 
do. We think it’s safe to surmise that most adults no longer experience pride when 
they tie their shoelaces as they did when they were first learning this skill as a young 
child. Thus, there must be something beyond agency that causes an individual to 
experience pride. We submit that this additional component is the belief that the 
activity has social merit (see Figure 1). As adults, we know that tying one’s shoes is 
no longer a challenge, and we know that others will not consider it to be an 
accomplishment. We do not expect to be socially rewarded for this activity because 
we have moved well beyond the age expected for mastery of this skill.  However, 
children who are still learning this activity are often praised when making steps 
towards mastering it.  As children come to acquire this skill, they may experience 
pride in the experience of their own agency. Indeed, work by Lewis et al. (1992) 
reported that 3-year-old children displayed more pride after successfully completing 
difficult tasks than after successfully completing easier tasks (“pride” was 
operationalised in terms of presenting an erect posture, smiling, social referencing via 
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eye contact with a parent, and/or verbalised self-praise). Yet we would argue that 
pride in the mastery of a task soon fades as children become aware that the act no 
longer merits praise. On our model, children experience more pride not simply due to 
their developing understanding of what it takes to master a skill, but because they are 
becoming increasingly aware of what merits praise.  
 
 
Figure 1. Modelling pride: its antecedent causes, and its outcomes. Whether someone 
benefited from the person’s agency discriminates moral pride from competence pride. 
Awareness of the social merit of the activity is a critical, amplifying cause of pride. 
Consistency with self-concept and social accountability are posited as mediators of 
the influence of pride on perseverance vs. coasting/licensing outcomes.  
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In our model, there is no need to posit a separate emotion “moral pride” in 
relation to pride in one’s competence or skill.  We urge for parsimony in the 
conceptual modelling of pride. Our position is that there is one emotion, pride (cf. 
Tracy & Robins, 2007a, b, 2014), which is comprised of core affective features (i.e., it 
is felt as arousing and has a positive valence) and is highly social in nature. Whether a 
person experiences pride in either a socially valued skill or a morally praiseworthy 
action, there must be a belief that the activity has social value for the full expression 
of pride. From the perspective of audience members, this could mean that others are 
envious of the accomplishment (Lange & Crusius, 2015), inspired by it (Schnall, 
Roper, & Fessler, 2010), or grateful for having benefitted from it (DeSteno, Bartlett, 
Baumann, Williams, & Dickens, 2010). The latter outcome (gratitude), we contend, is 
a unique feature of experiencing pride in one’s moral achievements that appears to be 
absent from the experience of skill-based pride. Unlike competence pride, which may 
result from the social recognition of unmatched expertise or physical prowess (Cheng 
et al., 2010; Tracy et al., 2010), moral pride tends to involve actions where a 
person/entity benefits from the agent’s goal-directed activities. Indeed, the additional 
and central social component of moral pride – i.e., that there is a social beneficiary of 
the accomplishment – might explain why past research has shown that moral 
achievements tend to elicit more intense feelings of pride than competence-based 
individual achievements. For example, Nakamura (2013) had men and women report 
their experiences of pride, both in the workplace and at home, over the course of 
seven consecutive days. Participants reported feelings of pride following 
“achievement experiences” and “prosocial experiences.” Although both experiences 
elicited pride, prosocial experiences produced more intense levels, both in the 
workplace and at home.    
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A similar perspective on pride has been put forth by Williams and DeSteno 
(2008, 2009), who argued that pride has a specifically social function, which is to 
promote activities that are positively merited by important others, thus enhancing the 
actor’s social standing. Research conducted by Williams and DeSteno (2008) supports 
this social functionalist approach to pride. These psychologists had participants 
perform a novel and difficult task, involving visual perception and cognitive ability—
estimating the number of dots that briefly appeared on a screen in different arrays. All 
participants received bogus feedback about how they had performed: some 
participants learned they were high achievers, while others learned they performed 
only moderately well; additionally, some of the high achievers also received social 
praise from the experimenter (“You got a score in the 94th percentile—great job! 
That’s one of the highest scores we’ve seen!”). Participants who received this positive 
social feedback felt more pride in their accomplishment and persevered longer on a 
follow-up cognitive-ability task of a similar nature (rotating objects in three-
dimensional space), compared to non-achievers and even compared to participants 
who learned they were high achievers but did not receive the social praise. One way 
to interpret these results is that participants who received the added social 
encouragement received additional information about the social value of their 
accomplishment, and it is this additional social information that led to their increased 
levels of pride and perseverance on the follow-up task. But there are other ways to 
interpret their results, to which we now turn.      
When Does Pride Promote Perseverance vs. Coasting/Licensing?         
Receiving social praise for an action may be motivating because social praise 
amplifies our experience of pride, and, in turn, these feelings of pride may be 
intrinsically motivating. Indeed, participants in Williams and DeSteno’s (2008) 
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studies reported higher levels of pride when receiving social praise for their display of 
cognitive ability, and these feelings of pride mediated the influence of the 
experimental conditions on the length of time participants spent on a similar follow-
up task (see also Williams & DeSteno, 2009). But another potential interpretation of 
the Williams and DeSteno’s study is that participants in the social praise condition 
were more likely to view the activity as diagnostic of their intelligence than 
participants in the other conditions, who did not receive social praise. When given the 
second opportunity to achieve high marks on the mental rotation task, participants in 
the social praise condition may have been highly motivated to prove that the earlier 
results (on the dot estimation task) were not a random fluke but truly reflected a key 
aspect of their identity—namely, that they are cognitively adept.   
Research by Fishbach and colleagues on self-regulation suggests that 
identifying an action as “self-diagnostic,” i.e., as diagnostic of an important aspect of 
one’s self-concept (e.g., how intelligent or generous one is), motivates people to be 
attentive to conflicts that could potentially jeopardise their self-view (see Fischbach & 
Woolley, 2015, for a review of this research). In the context of Williams and 
DeSteno’s experiment, participants who received direct praise from the experimenter 
on their accomplishment may have been placed under added accountability to affirm 
the self-diagnosticity of the results, and this might explain their additional 
perseverance on the task.  
Another way of modelling the self-regulatory role of the self-concept is in 
terms of “psychological connectedness” (Bartels & Rips, 2010; Bartels & Urminsky, 
2011). This refers to the perceived stability of some aspect of the self, or how similar 
one perceives the current self to be connected to one’s prospective self. Research by 
Bartels and Urminsky (2011) shows that when a person perceives greater overlap 
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between the current and future self, they are more willing to forgo an immediate 
reward for a delayed outcome. Presumably this is because the person sees the 
immediate outcome as having more consequence on their future self than if they 
perceived the immediate outcome as unconnected to whom they would like to be. 
Similarly, Fischbach and Woolley (2015) argue that when people perceive their 
current and future self to be tightly linked they are better able to identify conflicts that 
could potentially challenge this important self-image. Therefore, they are better able 
to exert control to avoid temptations and persevere toward an identity relevant goal.  
The importance of psychological connectedness for avoiding temptation was 
demonstrated in studies by Van Gelder, Hershfield, and Nordgren (2013). These 
researchers manipulated the vividness of people’s future selves either by having them 
write a letter to their future selves or witness an older, age-morphed version of their 
self within an immersive virtual reality environment. Participants who wrote a letter 
to their “self” 3 months in the future were more likely to succumb to an act of 
delinquency compared to participants who wrote a letter to their 20-years-into-the-
future self. Likewise, participants who interacted with an age-morphed version of 
themselves in VR were less likely to cheat on quiz than participants who interacted 
with a non-morphed version of themselves. Apparently, by making the future self 
more vivid, these researchers increased participants’ motivations to pass over an 
immediate temptation to preserve the integrity of the self into the future.  
Building on research pertaining to self-diagnosticity and psychological 
connectedness, we assert that the self-diagnosticity of a meritorious activity is an 
important mediator of motivational outcomes of pride (Figure 1).  Pride might not 
always promote perseverance on a task, and at times may even promote coasting (i.e., 
cessation of further effort following an accomplishment). Even more strongly, pride 
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may at times promote the licensing of unethical behavior. An increasingly large 
literature on moral self-licensing (for recent reviews, see Effron & Conway, 2015; 
Mullen & Monin, 2016) suggests that the realisation of a moral accomplishment can 
oftentimes result in subsequent licensing of morally questionable actions, such as not 
helping others, cheating on a task, or expressing more prejudicial views (Effron, 
Cameron, & Monin, 2009; Jordan, Mullen, & Murnighan, 2011; Mazar & Zhong, 
2010; Merritt et al., 2010; Monin & Miller, 2001). In a recent review of these moral 
licensing effects, Effron and Conway (2015) argued that licensing primarily occurs in 
situations where people are reflecting on their virtuous behavior, and the subsequent 
action or temptation is not related to an important aspect of the self. In the language of 
psychological connectedness, this means that the implications of the tempting 
situation, e.g., the temptation to not expend further effort, is psychologically distant 
from the self that one aspires to be. Effron and Conway argue that consistency effects, 
in contrast, are more common when a person focuses on moral deeds that are central 
to a person’s moral identity.   
 Other evidence for the importance of psychological stability in the self-
concept comes from a study by Young, Chakroff, and Tom (2012). These researchers 
found that individuals who intrinsically valued their moral character were more likely 
to display consistency effects than those who were motivated by impression-
management concerns. Participants were asked to recall and write about good deeds 
they had recently performed, to write about some recent conversation they had 
(baseline control), or write about recent bad deeds. Participants who wrote about good 
deeds subsequently donated almost twice as much money to a charity of their choice, 
compared to participants in the other two conditions. Interestingly, the highest 
donations were offered by individuals who did not mention whether their good deeds 
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were recognised or unrecognised by others, suggesting that the deed reflected an 
important aspect of their identity, and thus the motivation to preserve this identity was 
reinvigorated by writing about the good deed they recently performed.  
The self-diagnositicity of an action may be an important predictor of 
perseverance. However, when focusing on the future behavior, it may be equally 
important to consider whether a person is being held accountable for their actions 
(Figure 1). If a person has reason to believe that their performance will go unnoticed 
or unmerited, then this may reduce the motivational power of pride on future 
performance. This is another way to interpret the findings of Williams and DeSteno. It 
may not have been that participants viewed mentally rotating objects as reflecting on 
a diagnostic aspect of their self-concept. Rather, it may simply have been the 
perceived accountability of the second task, the belief that the experimenter would 
continue to evaluate their performance as they did in the original task, which spurred 
participants on in the social praise condition. Consistent with this accountability 
interpretation, research by Greene and Low (2014) has shown that, after participants 
recalled a morally positive action they had performed, they were less likely to exhibit 
licensing effects if they believed their future actions would be made public to others 
than if they thought their future actions would be kept private. Thus, social 
accountability may be another important moderator of the outcomes of experiencing 
pride, above and beyond the self-diagnosticity of the activity.   
Are There Benefits to Expressing Pride? 
Our model posits that pride ultimately serves a social function, motivating the 
enactment of behaviors that are valued by others. However, emotions also serve a 
more general social function in that they communicate important information to 
others (Giner-Sorolla, 2012; Martens, Tracy, & Shariff, 2012; Van Kleef, 2009). 
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Here, we consider what pride expressions might communicate to others, and what 
benefits expressing pride might have for the agent.  
When an individual expresses pride, they are communicating to others that 
they have done something that others should take notice of. Prototypical bodily 
expressions of pride involve an expanded bodily posture, with chin lifted, chest raised 
and outstretched arms (Lewis et al., 1992; Tracy & Robins, 2007c). Research has 
shown that people in various cultures reliably identify this posture with feelings of 
pride, rather than other emotion categories (Tracy & Robins, 2007b). Studies by 
Shariff and Tracy (2009) has shown that people implicitly associate this bodily 
expression, particularly with arms raised overhead, with notions of high status. 
Likewise, Horberg, Kraus and Keltner (2013) found that people associate bodily 
displays of pride with self-interested attempts to “get ahead” and an endorsement of 
competitive, meritocratic values. Tracy and Matsumoto (2008) documented how 
Olympic athletes behaved following victory at the Olympic and Paralympic Games. 
They reported that sighted, blind, and congenitally blind athletes reliably and 
automatically demonstrate bodily aspects of pride, particularly raised arms, 
immediately after achieving victory. Congenitally blind athletes, who never had 
visual experience with the raised arm victory display, engaged in this expression 
much like sighted athletes and those who lost their sight later in life. Tracy and 
Matsumoto argued that this is evidence for a “biologically innate” bodily expression 
of pride. Alternatively, congenitally blind athletes may have learned to raise their 
arms in victory via non-visual channels of social learning (e.g., hearing descriptions 
of other athletes when celebrating).   
Whether or not bodily expressions of pride are “biologically innate,” it is clear 
that the bodily configuration identified by Tracy and colleagues, with arms 
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outstretched and chest inflated, entails an attempt to make the person more noticeable. 
That is, the bodily expression of pride seems to afford or almost command social 
attention, which might explain why people in various cultures associate such a display 
with notions of status striving.  This commanding of social attention may be useful in 
some contexts, but in other contexts it may prove counterproductive, as signalling 
pride could be viewed as bragging or a blatant attempt to gain status, which could 
transform the meaning of an otherwise altruistic act.  
To understand the adaptive value of pride as an experience or as an 
expression, it is helpful to first consider what social status is, and why it is beneficial 
to enhance it. According to evolutionary psychologists, high social status grants an 
individual greater influence over group resources and collective decision making 
(Barkow, 1975; Cheng et al., 2010). As such, social status has been linked with 
improved reproductive fitness and wellbeing (Cowlishaw & Dunbar, 1991). Of 
course, for human beings, who compete not only through physical prowess and 
aggression, like other mammals, but as well via displays of political acumen and 
cognitive ability, there are multiple pathways to achieving high status (Barkow, 1975; 
Fessler, 2007; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). Cheng, Tracy, Foulsham, Kingstone and 
Henrich (2013) argue that there are fundamentally two streams of activity that may be 
employed by individuals to gain status: activities aimed at dominating others via the 
use of force or intimidation (this stream is thought to be evolutionarily more ancient, 
and is subject to sanctioning in many social hierarchies), and activities aimed at 
cultivating a desirable skill or expertise that can be shared and learned by others, thus 
conferring the expert status without the use of force. To this list we might add the 
pursuit of moral attributes, such as establishing oneself as a caring, reliable, fair, and 
loyal partner in social exchange (Piazza & Bering, 2008; Sperber & Baumard, 2012) 
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or an impartial, diplomatic, and devoted leader (Sanders et al., 2016). Thus, an 
emotion that, first, encourages status-seeking behaviors, whether via dominance or the 
cultivation of valued skills and traits; second, reinforces those behaviors to maintain 
the enhanced status, while, third, signalling one’s accomplishments or traits to others 
would have clear adaptive value. Pride has been posited to serve each of these 
adaptive functions (Tracy et al., 2010), which might explain the widespread use and 
identification of pride displays. 
Psychologists often discuss the positive social consequences of pride in terms 
of social capitalization, which is the sharing of individual achievements so as to 
derive additional social benefits above and beyond the achievement itself (Gable, 
Reis, Impett, & Asher, 2004). When experiencing pride, people are drawing attention 
to their achievements, and thereby sharing them. In motivating individuals to share 
their accomplishments with others, pride is therefore helping to maximise the social 
benefits of individual and joint accomplishments. Not surprisingly, then, certain 
aspects of pride, such as the self-directed, positive valence that accompanies success, 
has been positively linked with predictors of interpersonal functioning, such as dyadic 
adjustment, relationship satisfaction, and self-esteem, and negatively linked to 
antisocial behaviors, such as aggressiveness and Machiavellianism (Tracy et al., 
2009). At the same time, other aspects of pride, such as the inclination to engage in 
ostensible displays of pride, may be counterproductive to adaptive social functioning, 
insofar as others may be in direct competition for resources or important social 
outcomes, and may resent visible attempts to gain advancement. Indeed, work by 
Tracy et al. (2009) found that individuals who are inclined to displays of pride, which 
others may perceive as arrogance, suffer a loss of social support and are less satisfied 
with their social relationships. By contrast, individuals who are more conscientious 
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about appearing immodest, and who avoid over-attributing their successes exclusively 
to underlying abilities and not also to hard work, tend to be better socially adjusted 
(Holbrook et al., 2014a). This is not to say that there are not contexts in which it pays 
to engage in displays of pride. As argued by Holbrook et al. (2014a) the adaptive 
value of a pride display depends on the normative constraints operating within a 
situation. While it might be appropriate to express pride by raising one’s hands in the 
air after winning a medal at the Olympic Games, it would be socially offensive (and 
perhaps even comical) to do so if one has just won an argument with a colleague in a 
staff meeting.   
So, what evidence is there that pride expressions can improve social status? At 
an implicit level, individuals who express bodily displays of pride are thought to have 
greater social status than individuals who display other emotions, such as shame, 
embarrassment, or happiness (Shariff & Tracy, 2009). However, these implicit 
association studies have been conducted within context-free environments, without 
any prior information about the person’s character or abilities. Studies by Berman, 
Levine, Barasch and Small (2015) have shown, with regards to altruistic giving, that 
engaging in communication about a moral achievement can improve one’s social 
status, but this is largely the case for someone whose reputation is unknown to 
audience members. When a person is already thought to be charitable (e.g., is a social 
worker) or the good deed is already known to audience members, further 
communication about the charitable activity has little benefit or even counter-
productive effects. Thus, pride displays may enhance social status, but this may be 
limited to contexts in which audience members are mostly lacking relevant 
information about the individual’s behavior or character; otherwise, the display may 
be interpreted as arrogance or wanton competitiveness.    
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Pride may operate to improve social status, not necessarily via displays of 
pride, but through the experience of proud feelings which foster perseverance on 
socially relevant tasks. Williams and DeSteno (2009) had participants rate the social 
status of group members, following a group problem-solving task. Some of those 
group members had, immediately prior to the group task, completed an individual 
task and been told they had done exceptionally well. Thus, half the participants began 
the group problem-solving task feeling proud of their prior performance. These proud 
participants tended to assume more active roles during the group task, and, 
presumably, as a consequence, were perceived as more likeable by other members of 
the group. The authors concluded that the pride elicited in response to their individual 
accomplishment had enhanced their social status during the group task by motivating 
increased effort. 
 Besides enhancing social status, another social consequence of expressing 
pride is the emotional reactions that pride expressions elicit in others. Different 
emotional responses elicit distinct emotional reactions. For example, Giner-Sorolla 
and Espinosa (2010) showed that someone responsible for a transgression is likely to 
feel guilty about what they have done if their victim expresses anger, but is more 
likely to feel ashamed about who they are if their victim expresses disgust. This 
appears to be the case because disgust and shame are more focused on stable aspects 
of a person, while anger and guilt are focused more on specific actions. In an 
analogous manner, studies on pride have shown that pride expressions often evoke 
envy in others (Lange & Crusius, 2015). Like pride, envy is part of the affective-
motivational psychological suite that regulates social status, and it usually occurs 
when there is perceived inequality between two individuals, and the disadvantaged 
individual is motivated to re-establish an equal standing. If pride is thought to 
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enhance the agent’s social status following one’s own success, envy may enhance 
one’s social status following another person’s success that one is in competition with. 
Being able to respond to another person’s achievements with increased efforts to 
restore balance, is a response with clear adaptive value. This may be why people are 
quite accurate at identifying pride expressions in others (Liu, Yuan, Chen, & Yu, 
2016).  
Note, however, that just as psychologists have distinguished between two 
“facets” of pride (Tracy & Robins, 2007a), so too have psychologists distinguished 
between two facets of envy. Benign envy is characterised by the envious individual 
holding positive thoughts about the target (van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2009) 
and a desire to become as successful as the target (Crusius & Mussweiler, 2012). 
While benign envy can inspire individuals to achieve their own success, it has a 
nastier sibling, malicious envy, which is characterised by a person having negative 
thoughts about a rival (van de Ven et al., 2009) and taking pleasure in the rival’s 
suffering (van de Ven et al., 2015). Lange and Crusius (2015) report that expressions 
of pride more often elicit benign envy than malicious envy, presumably because most 
expressions of pride occur between affiliates who are devoted to mutualistic goals, 
rather than between direct competitors. Consequently, work on envy suggests yet 
another adaptive function of pride: the elevation of others. Just as a rising tide raises 
all ships, expressions of pride might inspire other individuals to strive for similar 
skills and successes, thus increasing the fitness of the group via the increased efforts 
of individual members. 
What Are the Challenges in Communicating Moral Achievements? 
 Moral pride involves an agent acting in a manner that benefits someone else, 
and thus may be construed as a prosocial act, guided by a regard for others, rather 
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than solely as a personal triumph, motivated by self-interest (Figure 1). As such, 
challenges exist in expressing moral pride that do not exist for expressing pride in a 
competence or skill-based achievement. While expressing pride in any type of 
achievement may smack of arrogance when the expression is deemed extreme or 
unwarranted (Holbrook et al., 2014a), we highlight two specific challenges that moral 
achievers face when expressing their pride that competence achievers may not 
similarly experience.  
First, because expressing pride may be construed as an attempt to capitalise on 
one’s successes, expressing pride over a moral achievement may undermine the 
perceived altruistic motive underlying the act. Second, expressing pride in a moral 
achievement might serve to make non-achievers feel morally threatened by 
highlighting the fact they have failed to act in a concurrently praiseworthy manner. 
Although a competence-based achievement may also be threatening in an analogous 
way, insofar as audience members may share in the same competence-based goals as 
the achiever, or may be in direct competition with the achiever, we argue that moral 
achievements have a greater scope to induce envy and resentment since moral 
activities are often available to audience members and are more likely to have 
implications for other people’s moral-identity goals, compared to competence-based 
activities, which tend to require more time and effort to cultivate and may not impact 
on other people’s competence goals. In Table 1, we have summarised the challenges 
of expressing pride by achievement domain.  
 
 
Table 1. Challenges involved in the expression of pride as a function of achievement 
domain. 
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1. Alters the perceived 
motivation for acting. 
 
NO 
(actor is still perceived 
as skilful) 
YES 
(actor no longer 
perceived as altruistic) 
2. Achievement is a source of 
implicit threat or criticism for 
others.  
OCCASIONALLY 
(only when the skills are 
in the same domain) 
 
OFTEN 
(since most moral traits 
are desirable) 
3. Perceived as arrogant, 






Expressing pride in moral achievements can undermine perceptions of altruism 
 There exists a catch-22 when expressing pride in one’s moral activities. On the 
one hand, a sizeable literature supports the notion that altruistic behaviour, and 
possessing a moral reputation, enhances one’s social desirability and status (e.g., 
Sperber & Baumard, 2012).  It is therefore in the individual’s interest to communicate 
one’s moral activities. Consider a study by McAndrew and Perilloux (2012) which 
had a confederate appear to behave altruistically by seeming to voluntarily endure 
pain so that their fellow group members would not be subjected to it. In a later task 
that required each of the participants to privately decide how they would like to divide 
a sum of money between the rest of the group, the altruistic confederates were 
rewarded with a greater portion of the money, and were considered to have greater 
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social status, than confederates who had not volunteered. There is also evidence that 
such helping behavior can enhance an individual’s attractiveness. Arnocky, Piché, 
Albert, Ouellette and Barclay (2016) found that self-reported altruism positively 
predicted the number of sexual partners and frequency of sex within relationships that 
participants reported having. In a second study, the amount of money participants 
donated to charity positively correlated with the amount of lifetime sexual partners, 
casual sexual partners, and sexual partners in the past year. Although these results are 
correlational, they are suggestive that there may be an advantage in drawing 
awareness to one’s moral behavior.  
 On the other hand, the problem with expressing moral pride is that doing so 
might undermine the prosocial nature of the act itself (Berman et al., 2015). Altruism 
is characterized by a motivation to help another individual without personal benefit 
(Batson, 1990). The existence of intrinsic rewards such as pride or warm feelings 
experienced following a moral action raises the question of whether a truly altruistic 
act can exist (Batson, 1987; de Waal & Suchak, 2010). Yet, separate from this 
philosophical debate about the existence of “pure” altruism, we might question the 
moral character of a person who fails to display any emotion upon engaging in an 
action that benefits others. Emotions are often thought to be involuntary and thus 
reliable cues to a person’s character (Barasch, Levine, Berman, & Small, 2014). Thus, 
it may not be the experience of pride that we criticise moral achievers for, but the 
perceived attempt to capitalise on the achievement for reputational gain.  
Research by Barasch et al. (2014) highlights that individuals who feel 
positively about their altruistic behavior still receive moral credit for their actions. In 
one study, participants read feedback ostensibly from a person who claimed that they 
had experienced a “warm, positive feeling” after donating to charity, and the 
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experimenters manipulated the intensity of that emotional response. The greater the 
intensity of the positive emotion that the moral do-gooder experienced, the more they 
were perceived to be motivated by their emotional state. Importantly, the intensity of 
the positive emotion following the donation also predicted ratings of moral character: 
the greater the emotional intensity, the more moral the person was considered to be.  
Hence, it seems that expressing positive emotion about one’s good deeds can lead to 
positive social evaluations under certain circumstances.  
One noteworthy aspect of Barash et al.’s study is that the positive feelings 
experienced by the person were communicated to participants by the experimenter, 
rather than the person themselves. Thus, participants may not have viewed the target 
as attempting to gain status for their moral deed. Another study conducted by this 
research team manipulated whether participants perceived the do-gooder as motivated 
for material (a tax break) or reputational (media coverage) benefits in exchange for 
their charity donation. In both cases, such a person was rated as having less moral 
character than a person motivated by positive feelings, highlighting that it is the 
attempt to gain status (i.e., social capital) that participants found distasteful, not the 
experience of positive emotion itself, following a moral achievement. This study also 
suggests that whether the actor themselves is seen communicating information about 
the moral deed, or another person (e.g., a friend) who communicates the information, 
may be an important moderator of the social response to expressing moral pride, as 
the former suggests a greater orientation towards status striving. Communicating 
directly to others about a moral deed may be more likely to signal an attempt to 
engage in competitive altruism, whereas hearing about another’s moral deed through 
other channels may preserve the innocence of the act as a truly other-oriented deed.  
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 Work by Newman and Cain (2014) on “tainted altruism” further highlights the 
challenges of communicating moral deeds. Their research identified that people who 
perform charitable actions are perceived to be less moral if they personally benefit 
from the charitable action, irrespective of how generous the action is perceived to be. 
The challenge of communicating one’s good deeds is exacerbated by how easily 
people question the authenticity of altruistic motives. Critcher and Dunning (2011) 
asked participants to reflect on selfless and selfish actions, and reported that 
participants were relatively more cynical of the motives of selfless actions than they 
were of selfish actions.  A subsequent study by the same authors showed that 
participants were more likely to suspect a philanthropist had selfish motives than 
selfless motives, when reflecting on why they behaved altruistically. Lin-Healy and 
Small (2013) found that people even question the motives of moral do-gooders in 
circumstances where the personal benefit is a matter of chance. In their study, raffle 
winners were perceived as being less nice than those who did not win the raffle, 
despite everyone having performed the same altruistic act to be entered into the raffle.  
Berman et al. (2015) refer to the catch-22 surrounding the transmission of 
moral acts as the “braggart’s dilemma.” Their research is particularly relevant to the 
topic of pride, because they define bragging as the “informing others of a positive, 
self-relevant behavior or trait….[with a specific focus on] those who brag about their 
good deeds” (p. 91). Expressions of moral pride, on this view, are bragging by 
definition. However, the results of Berman and colleagues’ research do not suggest 
that all moral bragging has an equally negative effect on how altruistic a person is 
perceived. Communicating information about a good deed was only counter-
productive when participants were already aware of the person’s actions, or the 
person was already considered to be highly moral. Thus, it is possible that pride 
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expressions might initially serve some benefit in drawing attention to one’s good 
deeds, when little is known about the action or the person’s character. Yet, the data 
presented by Berman and colleagues suggest that prolonged or repeated expressions 
of pride might ultimately taint the moral accomplishment and raise questions about 
the actor’s altruistic motives.  
The motives underlying skill-based achievements, such as winning at a sports 
contest, are fully apparent—the motive is to be the best; thus, such communications 
are unlikely to be scrutinized to the extent that moral-based achievements are. In this 
way, the communication of competence-based achievements may not pose the same 
dilemma as when communicating pride in one’s moral achievements. Important for 
our comparison between competence-based and moral pride, in later studies Berman 
et al. also contrasted evaluations of individuals who bragged, or did not brag, about 
prosocial actions vs. skill-based (athletic) achievements. They found that bragging 
about skill-based achievements did not undermine the motivation for the action (e.g., 
having a genuine passion for running) as it did bragging about prosocial actions (e.g., 
having a genuine passion for helping others). Furthermore, while prosocial actors 
were penalised for advertising a moral deed, in terms of being seen as less moral, 
skill-based achievers were not penalised, in terms of being seen as any less skilful.    
 Research into the Braggart’s dilemma leads to the tentative conclusion that the 
“taint” of communicating moral deeds occurs mostly in situations where audience 
members suspect the actor of having performed the act for reputational gain. It also 
highlights clear differences in the social challenges faced by moral and skill-based 
achievers. We propose that vicarious pride may offer a solution to this dilemma 
surrounding moral pride. Expressing pride in joint activities or in others’ moral 
achievements with whom one identifies may serve the purpose of communicating 
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one’s own moral character, while at the same time avoiding criticisms of an attempt to 
gain a competitive edge. Thus, vicarious pride may be a more successful way to 
accomplish the signalling function of moral pride—i.e., signalling to others the moral 
composition of the self—by avoiding the cynicism aroused by transmitting moral 
information about oneself.  
Pride as a source of implicit moral criticism for others 
The second major challenge of transmitting moral-based achievements 
involves the scope of the threat that moral achievements have for audience members, 
relative to the scope of ability-based achievements. A person’s moral character is 
perceived, by many, to be “core” to who they are as a person, more so than other 
traits, such as those related to competence or ability (Goodwin, 2015; Goodwin, 
Piazza, & Rozin, 2014; Strohminger & Nichols, 2014). Furthermore, a person’s moral 
character is the most valued and sought after aspect of a person, certainly more so 
than aspects related to competence (Goodwin et al., 2014; Landy, Piazza, & Goodwin, 
2016). Moral traits are also more likely to be viewed as tightly interrelated, 
comprising a wholistic “moral self” (Aquino & Reed, 2002), while competence traits 
are not interrelated in the same way, but tend to be viewed more in isolation 
(Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2015). For example, research by Goodwin et al. (2015) 
suggests that we do not expect someone who is highly competent with mathematics to 
be a great athlete, or vice versa, but we do expect a person to be both kind and honest, 
trustworthy and fair, and so on, and failure to attain any single aspect of morality may 
be detrimental to evaluations of a person’s moral character, while this is not true for 
evaluations of competence.  
Because morality is so fundamental to a person’s self-concept, and morality 
traits are treated as reflecting more globally on a person’s moral character, whereas a 
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person’s competence is viewed as more divisible and domain specific, we anticipate 
that people are more likely to share morality-relevant goals with each other than 
competence-relevant goals.  This feature of moral self-regulation, we argue, makes 
the communication of moral achievements a more prevalent threat to others than 
achievements based on particular skills. Furthermore, competence-based 
achievements often take years of hard work and practice to cultivate, while moral 
achievements, though at times may require great skill (e.g., a soldier’s performance in 
combat or a vegan’s forgoing of pleasurable commodities), more often than not 
require nothing more than simple sacrifices of time or effort, which make moral 
activities more readily available to others. These two aspects of moral achievements, 
we posit, combine to make the communication of moral deeds particularly troubling 
for others.   
Minson and Monin (2012) coined the term “do-gooder derogation” to describe 
what happens when somebody is made aware of, and their own moral self-view 
threatened by, another person’s moral successes. Their findings suggest that people 
can respond defensively to the do-gooder’s achievement. The authors specifically 
proposed that such defensive behavior results from backlash against the threat to self-
worth. Focusing on the topic of how meat eaters perceive vegetarians to view them, 
the researchers discovered that when meat eaters were made to feel morally criticised 
by vegetarians, they verbally derogated vegetarians to a greater extent than when they 
did not perceive vegetarians to make claims to moral superiority. What is unclear 
from this study is the precise source of do-gooder derogation. Were omnivores in this 
study more reactive because they thought vegetarians would be critical of their meat-
eating practices, which they felt guilty about, or because they perceived that 
vegetarians were claiming more credit than meat eaters thought they deserved?  
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Some recent unpublished data from our lab sheds some light on the 
mechanisms underlying do-gooder derogation. In one study (Piazza & McLatchie, 
unpublished), participants were presented with filler information about a young 
woman who was described to be “dedicated” to a vegan diet, eating fair-trade foods, 
or styling hair. Thus, in all three conditions the woman displayed the virtue of 
dedication, with only the activity she was dedicated to varied across condition. 
Participants rated one of the targets on how much they liked them, how guilty they 
made them feel, how critical they thought the target would be of them, and how much 
credit they deserved for their activities. In line with Minson and Monin's (2012) do-
gooder derogation effect, participants rated that they liked the target less when she 
was dedicated to a moral activity, i.e., was a vegan or someone who eats only fair-
trade products, relative to when she was dedicated to an amoral activity (hair styling). 
Critically, in a multiple mediation analysis, ratings of deserved credit did not serve as 
a mediator of target category and liking for the target. Only feelings of guilt and 
anticipating the target to be critical of one’s own actions emerged as significant, 
independent mediators. Thus, at least based on this study, do-gooder derogation 
appears to work primarily via concerns about how the target will criticize one’s own 
actions, and not via perceptions that the other person is over-claiming credit.   
 In line with this argument, we posit that the reflective sting of a moral 
achievement is likely to be greatest among individuals who perceive morality to be an 
important aspect of their identity, but this should only operate in contexts where 
audience members perceive there to be a moral deficit in themselves and thus 
anticipate criticism from others. Research by Aquino and Reed (2002) has shown that 
individuals vary to a measurable degree on how strongly they strive to be moral. To 
the extent that a person is motivated to be viewed as moral, and see their moral 
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character as central to their self-concept, they should find the moral achievements of 
others more threatening. Indeed, a study by Cramwinckel, van Dijk, Scheepers, and 
van den Bos (2013) exposed omnivorous participants to a person refusing to eat a 
sausage on moral grounds. The researchers measured the extent to which participants 
considered being a moral person central to their identity using Aquino and Reed’s 
(2002) moral identity scale. The study found that people who scored highest on the 
moral identity scale felt the worst when the confederate in the experiment refused to 
eat the sausage on moral grounds. Yet this study was carried out with participants 
who eat meat, so it remains unclear whether this might only be true of individuals 
who view the moral activity as reflecting poorly on their own moral identity. 
Individuals who are secure in their own moral identity, for example, because they can 
rely on their own moral credentials based on past deeds, may be inoculated from the 
sting of others’ moral achievements and may even seize on them as opportunities to 
bask in their own moral successes.   
Consistent with this idea, a study by Jordan and Monin (2008) found that 
when people had time to reflect on a highly valued skill or aspect of their identity, 
they were inoculated from the do-gooder derogation effect. In one study, participants 
witnessed a person rebelling against an action that reflected poorly on them.  Some 
participants had a chance to write about a valued quality of themselves before 
evaluating the moral rebel, while others did not. Those who had a chance to self-
affirm did not derogate the rebel’s character as those who did not have a chance. 
Thus, providing individuals with an opportunity to affirm important aspects of 
themselves may be one way to minimise the implicit threat lurking within the moral 
achievements of others.     
Conclusion 
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Here, we have proposed a comprehensive model of pride that parsimoniously 
draws a distinction between pride in response to skill-based achievements and moral 
activities. While identifying pride as a self-conscious emotion, our model agrees with 
previous literature identifying pride as a highly social emotion. As we have argued in 
this chapter, pride-eliciting events must be thought to be valued by relevant others. 
Our model primarily addresses two questions surrounding moral pride: first, the 
conditions in which pride is likely to motivate perseverance toward future goals 
versus coasting or resting on one’s laurels. Drawing on the licensing literature, our 
model posits that achievers are likely to persevere with their behaviour when the 
activity is considered central to their self-identity and/or the actor is held socially 
accountable. Second, we identified two unique challenges that exist when 
communicating pride in response to a moral achievement, not typically faced when 
communicating pride in skill-based achievements: expressions of moral pride can 
taint the praiseworthy motive of the moral activity, and threaten the moral self-regard 
of audience members. Thus, while pride has clear adaptive benefits in the form of 
motivating status striving and signalling success to others, these benefits are not 
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